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HOW A REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN HERO LOST HIS CAUSE
In Viva Zapata (the 1952 movie), a Mexican revolutionary hero named
Zapata led a band of hungry peasants in a wild uprising against the
government in power.  In the film, Zapata (played by Marlon Brando, himself)
scored some crowd-pleasing victories, but (historians tell us) the rule-making
powers ultimately prevailed, reigning in the Wild One and ending (forever)
Zapata’s quixotic quest.1
HOW A REVOLUTIONARY MEXICAN PLAINTIFF LOST HIS CASE
Nearly fifty years later (in 2001), another Mexican revolutionary named
Zapata scored an improbable (initial) victory, this time in U.S. Federal District
Court, by persuading a trial judge to buy the argument (quite a wild one, in our
view) that Article 74 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International
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Sale of Goods2 permits a successful claimant under the CISG to recover, as
damages for breach of contract, the attorney fees incurred in litigating the
claim.3  According to this decision, Article 74 of the Convention pre-empts
(displaces) the long-standing “American rule” on attorney fees, which in U.S.
courts requires (with certain exceptions) that each litigant shoulder its own
attorneys’ fees, win or lose.
At the time that District Court decision was issued, some CISG
commentators—including the leading one, Professor Peter Schlechtriem,
himself—expressed approval for the District Court’s extension of the
Convention’s sphere of application to include the way in which national courts
allocate attorneys’ fees.4  In Pittsburgh and Copenhagen, however, the two of
us—operating independently as “lone wolves”—arrived at remarkably similar
positions that rejected the decision’s (wildly) “expansionist” CISG view.5  Our
position was (and remains) based on several considerations, including the fact
that the Convention’s travaux préparatoires contain nothing suggesting that
the drafters intended Article 74 to encompass the recovery of attorneys’ fees
as damages,6 the fact that awarding attorneys fees as CISG damages would
yield absurd results,7 and the fact that permitting recovery of attorney fees as
damages under Article 74 of the Convention would contradict the
overwhelming majority (perhaps thousands) of CISG decisions from loser-
pays jurisdictions, which have routinely awarded attorney fees not as damages
under the Convention, but on the basis of the loser-pays rules of the tribunals’
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domestic legal system.8  As a result, we concluded, the question of
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in the course of litigating a claim
under the CISG should be treated as a “procedural” issue beyond the scope of
the CISG and governed by the tribunal’s domestic law.9
In 2002, Circuit Judge Richard Posner (The Father of Law & Economics,
himself) reversed the District Court’s (wild) decision,10 thus “siding with us”11
and cutting the revolutionary Zapata plaintiff—and the CISG’s Sphere of
Application—back down to size.  Later that year, we (lone wolves) joined
forces to write Viva Zapata!,12 which explained (carefully) why the Zapata
trial judge had reached the wrong result for the wrong reasons.  At the same
time, we explained why Judge Posner, in reversing the trial court, reached the
right result for at least some of the right reasons—although he also fell into
some confusion.  In particular, we emphasized what we then saw (and still
see) as an inconsistency between Posner’s analysis and the implications of his
legal logic:  although his opinion indicates that the “matter” of attorneys’ fees
is “governed, but not settled” by the Convention, the logic of Posner’s ratio
actually leads to the conclusion that the attorneys’ fees “matter” is simply not
governed by the CISG.
In December 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court put the final nail in the Zapata
plaintiff’s coffin by refusing to grant a petition for certiorari,13 to the dismay
of those CISG-expansionist fans who had hoped for Supreme Court review.14
THE ACADEMIC AFTERMATH
In this issue of the Journal Professor Schlechtriem presents his own
analysis of Judge Posner’s decision in Zapata.15  As we did in our Viva
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Zapata! piece,16 Professor Schlechtriem reduces the ratio of the decision to
three main arguments.  The first of these is that the Convention is about
contracts, not about procedure, and recovery of attorneys’ fees is a matter of
procedure.  Commenting on this argument, Professor Schlechtriem states:  “In
international cases at least, without an international uniform classification the
categorization of a question as substantive or procedural can at best be a legal
façon de parler [way of speaking] for a demarcation based on aspects of the
case, but it cannot answer the substantive issue itself.”17  Now, we have no
problem with that (French) proposition, especially since Judge Posner himself
uses the substance-procedure distinction as a “way of speaking.”  Quite
obviously (at least to Professor Posner and us), the Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods is mainly “about” substantive rules of
contracts:  Just look at the name of the Convention, not to speak of its content!
The common-sense logic of this argument is not refuted—or rendered
passé—by the fact the Convention also manages, en passant, to “say” a few
things about procedural matters such as the burden of proof18 and proving
contracts by means of witnesses.19
Commenting on the second head of Judge Posner’s analysis, Professor
Schlechtriem concedes that the trial court’s approach in Zapata would lead to
serious anomalies (another one of our arguments20), and he attaches “great
weight” to Posner’s (and our21) third (and final) argument that the United
States presumably would have abstained from ratifying the CISG rather than
“abandon the hallowed American rule.”  Well, isn’t that (just) like “saying”
(façon de parler) that the CISG was never intended to encompass recovery of
attorney fees because that was presumed to be a matter of procedure?
Judging by the tenor of his latest contribution, it hasn’t been easy for
Professor Schlechtriem to abandon his original position, i.e., that the “matter”
of attorneys’ fees is rightly regarded as a matter “governed, but not settled”
by the Convention, and it may be that he (if he “had his druthers”) would
(still) prefer to use the CISG to the “settle” that matter.  In any event,
Professor Schlechtriem has now (lamentingly) acknowledged the quixotic
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nature of such a quest.22  Better than most, he can read the writing on the
American judicial wall:  the American decision-makers have made their
decision, which will almost surely remain final, whatever (any) academics
might advise American judges to think.
Less lamenting (though perhaps more pugnacious) is the latest (2006)
“Advisory Opinion” rendered by the CISG Advisory Council (of which
Professor Schlechtriem is a most distinguished member), including the
following “black letter” proposition:  “Under Article 74, the aggrieved party
cannot recover expenses associated with litigation of the breach.”23  It is,
of course, hardly surprising that the (unanimous) Advisory Council Opinion
is clear and unequivocal:  attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered as damages
under the CISG.  What one might wonder about is why the Council
(unanimously) stamps Judge Posner’s (and our) substance-procedure
distinction as “outdated and unproductive”24 (which certainly sounds worse
than façon de parler!).  The Council is, of course, entitled to its opinion on the
substance-procedure issue, but we note that the “Opinion” on this particular
point remains a conclusory assertion with virtually no documentation, except
for a somewhat curious invitation to “see” a scholarly article on the substance-
procedure distinction as it relates to a completely different (conflict of laws)
context.25
Since we have explained and documented our own position (both
individually and collectively) on the attorney fee issue itself, we have little
more to say on that particular score.26  We do, however, take this opportunity
to comment on the Advisory Council Opinion “approach.”  In our view, that
approach suffers from two problems.  First, it distorts our own use of the
substance-procedure distinction in determining the scope of the Convention.
Second, it appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the role and authority
of the Advisory Council itself.
On the first point, the Advisory Council Opinion states:
Some courts and commentators believe that the recovery of litigation expenses is a
procedural matter outside the scope of the Convention’s substantive damages provisions
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[citing, inter alia, our Viva Zapata piece]. . . . The issue of whether litigation expenses
should be considered as damages for purposes of Article 74 cannot be resolved through
a substance/procedure distinction.  Whether a matter is considered substantive or
procedural may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may depend on the
circumstances of a particular case.  Relying upon such a distinction in this context is
outdated and unproductive.27
This passage seems to suggest that we (Flechtner and Lookofsky) rely on the
substantive-procedural distinction as a test—in fact as the sole and exclusive
test—for determining whether the recovery of attorney fees is covered by the
Convention.  But that is hardly a reasonable reading of our analysis.  In fact,
we have used the distinction between substance and procedure not as a legal
“test” for the Convention’s scope, but as one of the tools available to
determine whether the CISG drafters intended to deal with attorney’s fees in
the CISG.28  In other words, we have not invoked the substance-procedure
distinction as a (formalistic) “test” to determine whether the recovery of
attorneys’ fees (matter) lies within the scope of the CISG; but rather as a tool
for determining and then expressing the apparent intent of the drafters (an
intent discovered without even referring to the substance-procedure
distinction) not to have the Convention govern the issue,29 and as an
explanation for why courts (and, presumably, the drafters of the text of the
CISG) simply assumed that the matter was beyond the scope of the
Convention—i.e., because they thought of it as a matter of procedure rather
than as a matter of substantive sales rules of the type provided in the
Convention.
This method of using the substance-procedure distinction (as a tool to
discern the CISG drafters’ intent) is, we think, clearly justified, as the drafters
themselves employed the same distinction to determine the proper scope of the
Convention in another context:  a proposal to add language to the Convention
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30. UNCITRAL, Report of the Committee of the Whole relating to the draft Convention on the
International Sales of Goods, 1977, ¶¶ 177-178, reprinted in JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
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that would have expressly allocated the burden of proof concerning
conformity of delivered goods was rejected because “it was considered
inappropriate for the Convention, which relates to the international sale of
goods, to deal with matters of evidence or procedure.”30
This last fact leads to our second criticism of the Advisory Council
Opinion:  since the Convention drafters themselves employed the substance-
procedure distinction in determining the proper scope of the CISG, where does
the Council come by the authority to declare that distinction is not a proper
tool of analysis because it is “outdated and unproductive”?  The Advisory
Council is, quite obviously, not an “international legislature”; unlike those
who drafted the Convention and utilized the substance-procedure distinction,
the Council is comprised merely of self-appointed representatives of the CISG
scholarly community.  It is certainly a distinguished group of scholars, but
organizing themselves into a (private) body gives their opinions no more
inherent authority concerning the meaning of the CISG than the opinions of
other scholars:  Advisory Council opinions have authority only insofar as they
present a convincing analysis, and where those opinions depart from the
intention of those who have actual law-making authority—as clearly is the
case with regard to the substance-procedure distinction—the Council’s
opinions have no authority whatsoever.  The Advisory Council is welcome to
think (and opine) that the substance procedure distinction is “outdated and
unproductive,” but the Council has not been authorized to excise the
distinction from scholarly Convention analysis when the drafters in fact
themselves used that distinction to explain what they thought was the proper
scope of the CISG.
Consider an analogous situation:  Article 4(a) of the Convention excludes
from the scope of the CISG questions of “validity of the contract or of any of
its provisions, or of any usage.”  The distinction between validity and non-
validity issues has also proven a difficult and elusive one that might also be
regarded as “outdated and unproductive.”  It would, nevertheless, be absurd
to think the Advisory Council (or any other private group or party) has the
authority to declare—as it has with regard to the substance-procedure
distinction—that questions concerning the scope of the Convention therefore
“cannot be resolved” by reference to the validity/non-validity distinction.  It
is equally absurd to think that an Advisory Council Opinion can render the
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substance-procedure distinction irrelevant.  Whether members of the Advisory
Council like it or not, the distinction between substance and procedure,
remains—must remain—one of the tools that informed analysts employ in
determining the proper scope of the Convention:  the drafters—those who in
fact were appointed to fashion the treaty and whose product defined what the
sovereign Contracting States agreed to—used the distinction for this purpose,
as evidenced by both the nature of the Convention and its travaux
préparatoires.
In the case of attorneys’ fees the drafters, we believe, followed the
distinction between substance and procedure—albeit probably unconsciously:
they appear to have assumed that the Convention does not deal with the
attorney fees issue (more precisely, it never occurred to them it might deal
with the issue) because they (would have) thought of it as a “matter” of
procedure.  There is, as we have noted elsewhere, nothing at all in the travaux
préparatoires to suggest that the drafters ever contemplated the wild notion
that Article 74 (or any other CISG rule) “governed” the recovery of attorney
fees—this despite the issue’s great importance not only in the U.S., but also
in loser-pays jurisdictions.31  So now, in 2007, it seems to us absurd “counsel”
that we should hide our eyes and ignore a distinction that the drafters
themselves invoked, merely because some academics (now) find that
distinction hard to use, “outdated” or “unproductive.”
Of course we are taking an intent-oriented approach to interpretation.  A
pure “textualist” might argue that the drafters’ intent was irrelevant, and that
the “plain meaning” of Article 74 encompasses attorneys fees because it
covers all “losses” caused by a breach.  We frankly have little regard for this
view of language and interpretation.  What, for example, is the “plain
meaning” of the second sentence of Article 13, which provides that under the
Convention a contract of sale “may be proved by any means. . . .”  Since the
plain dictionary meaning of “any” is (of course) “any,” the “plain meaning”
of the sentence is that courts applying the Convention must let the proponent
of a contract prove its existence with (e.g.) hearsay evidence, by evidence that
domestic rules of evidence would block as prejudicial or violative of public
policy, by Ouija boards, by reading sheep entrails—in short by “any” means.
Obviously, that “plain meaning” is completely absurd, and the reason it is
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absurd is because it ignores the intent behind the provision (which is to
prevent the indirect imposition of formality requirements through rules
limiting the kind of evidence needed to establish existence of a contract32), and
because it fails to acknowledge that the Convention was in general not
intended to address procedural matters (such as evidentiary rules).
SUMMING UP
We firmly maintain our original position that the recovery of the costs of
attorneys employed in litigating a claim under the Convention is a matter
beyond the scope of the CISG, governed instead by the domestic law of the
forum as a procedural question.  Now that all but the most obstinate
internationalists appear to have accepted the outcome of Judge Posner’s
opinion in Zapata (which creates a judge-made fact that the CISG does not
pre-empt the “American rule”33), the attack has turned to Judge Posner’s ratio,
especially to his use of the substance-procedure distinction (or, rather, the
somewhat distorted picture of that use that is attributed to both him and us).
Because we think those attacking critics fail to understand the real “ratio”
underlying the Zapata precedent—the simple but well-founded premise that
the CISG does not govern the “matter” of attorneys’ fees—we have (briefly)
re-entered the fray.  Time will tell whether our own “Advisory Opinion” might
ultimately persuade others to see the issue in the light that we (continue to) do.
